![]() Many cling to the positivistic view that, in the words of Latto (1986, 309, 313), "Conscious awareness in other animals is a closed world about which we can do no more than speculate. Because evidence for or against animal consciousness has been difficult to evaluate by scientific methods, the contemporary view of many cognitive psychologists can be summed up as: "Animal cognition: yes of course but animal consciousness: unlikely, or, if it does occur, impossible to detect, since whatever the animal does might be done unconsciously." This intennediate position of contemporary cognitive psychologists is a great advance, but the reluctance to move ahead from cognition to consciousness may weU be a lingering residue of behaviorism. Because the vast majority of human brain functioning occurs without our conscious awareness, it is possible that all animal behavior is unconscious. Yet cognitive psychologists are very suspicious of claims that animals are conscious, even when they recognize that cognition must be assumed in order to explain the animal's behavior. That is, animals want some things, fear others, and expect that actions will lead to certain results. Internal manipulations of such representations are held to result in decisions, and classification of objects in relation to desires and beliefs. These cognitive processes entail, among other attributes, representations, including memories, expectancies, and anticipations. Internal processes within brains or minds are of the utmost importance in determining the behavior of men and animals. ![]() They have abandoned the taboos of strict behaviorism and consider themselves cognitive psychologists because they recognize that VII Behaviorism was the dominant school of psychology for many years, but during the past generation psychology has undergone a "cognitive revolution" as most psychologists have adopted a third, intermediate position. They attempted to explain all behavior, animal and human, exclusively in terms of external influences and how these affect overtly observable behavior. In stark contrast was the second position, that of the strict behaviorists, who used to argue that subjective mental experiences are inconsequential side effects that should be totally ignored by serious scientists. The first, commonsense view is that animals are likely to think about what they are doing and the results they expect from their actions, especially when these are adapted to varying and often unpredictable circumstances. Contemporary human thinking about animal mentality falls into three camps, although none is a monolithic dogma and all include many shades of opinion. But because conscious awareness adds so much to an unconscious "sleepwalker" existence, it is important to consider the evidence suggesting both cognitive processes and conscious thinking. Many students of animal cognition avoid consideration of whether animal cognition is ever accompanied or influenced by conscious thinking. This has led to many significant discoveries about animal behavior and cognition. Cognitive ethology, the analysis of cognitive processes in nonhuman animals, has attracted thoughtful and constructive contributions from fields as diverse as behavioral ecology and the philosophy of mind. This spectrum of strongly advocated views demonstrates the basic importance attached to the nature of animal mentality by both scientists and philosophers. ![]() This book will review evidence of versatile thinking by animals, and of equal significance will be a representative sampling of the wide range of scientific and scholarly opinion about animal minds. The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence ofPapcr for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.Ĥ Construction of Artifacts 67 5 Tools and Special Devices 101 6 Concepts 115 7 Physiological Indices of Thinking 142 8 Communication as Evidence of Thinking 154 9 Symbolic Communication 175 10 Deception and Manipulation 195 11 Apes and Dolphins 211 12 The Significance of Animal Consciousness 233 Bibliography 261 Index 297 v Includes bibliographical relUcnces and index. (Donald Redfield), 1915Animal minds/Donald R. ISBN (cloth) 0♲26♳0863♴ ISBN (paper) 0♲26♳0864♲ Library ofCongrcss Cataloging-in-Publication Data Published 1992 Paperback edition 1994 Printed in the United States of America 0504 03 02 01 0099989796 The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London e 1992 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS CHICAGO AND LONDON
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